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Abstract 
SYN-flooding attack uses the weakness available in TCP’s three-
way handshake process to keep it from handling legitimate 
requests. This attack causes the victim host to populate its 
backlog queue with forged TCP connections. In other words it 
increases Ploss (probability of loss) and Pa (buffer occupancy 
percentage of attack requests) and decreases Pr (buffer 
occupancy percentage of regular requests) in the victim host and 
results to decreased performance of the host. This paper proposes 
a self-managing approach, in which the host defends against 
SYN-flooding attack by dynamically tuning of its own two 
parameters, that is, m (maximum number of half-open 
connections) and h (hold time for each half-open connection). In 
this way, it formulates the defense problem to an optimization 
problem and then employs the learning automata (LA) algorithm 
to solve it. The simulation results show that the proposed defense 
strategy improves performance of the under attack system in 
terms of Ploss, Pa and Pr. 
Keywords: SYN-flooding, DoS, TCP, Learning automata, 
queuing model. 
1. Introduction 
Security has become necessary in a world where more 
services are relying on internet technology. For this reason, 
it has attracted a lot of attention in various areas of 
communication networks [16, 25, and 9]. One of the 
security breaches is denial-of-service (DoS) attack. A DoS 
attack can be considered as an attempt of attackers to 
prevent legal users from gaining a normal network service 
[27, 30, and 14]. Recent evaluations [15, 18] show that 
DoS attacks ranks at the fourth place in the list of the most 
important attack classes for information systems. More 
than 90% of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks 
exploit a system’s transmission control protocol (TCP) 
[12]. A well-known DoS attack is SYN-flooding attack. A 
TCP connection is established in what is known as a 3-
way handshake. When a client efforts to start a TCP 
connection to a server, firstly, the client requests a 
connection by sending a SYN packet to the server. Then, 
the server returns a SYN-ACK, to the client. Finally, the 
client acknowledges the SYN-ACK with an ACK, at 
which point the connection is established and data transfer 
commences [11, 6]. In a SYN flooding attack, attackers 
use this protocol to their benefit. The attacker sends a large 
number of SYN packets to the server. Each of these 
packets has to be handled like a connection request by the 
server, so the server must answer with a SYN-ACK. The 
attacker does not answer to the SYN-ACK, which will 
cause the server to have a half-open connection. The result 
is that the server is left waiting for a reply from a large 
quantity of connections. There are a limited number of 
connections a server can handle. Once all of these are in 
use, waiting for connections that will never come, no new 
connections can be made whether valid or not. There are 
some proposed defenses for this attack. Zuquete [3] 
proposes SYN cookies to defend against SYN-flooding 
attacks. A SYN-flood detection approach was proposed in 
[13]. This approach monitors the difference between the 
number of SYN segments and the number of FIN or RST 
segments since, under normal TCP behavior, each SYN 
will correspond to a FIN or RST. Therefore, a sharp rise in 
difference between the number of SYNs and FINs/RSTs, 
within a certain time frame, is indicative of a SYN 
flooding attack. Chang [23] mentioned a simple queuing 
model for the SYN-flooding attack. Long [19] proposed 
two queuing models for the DoS attacks in order to obtain 
the packet delay jitter and the loss probability. Peng [26] 
compiled an IP address database of previous successful 
connections. When a network was suffering from traffic 
congestion, an IP address that did not appear in the 
database was construed as more suspicious. As another 
work [6] proposes an autonomous approach in which the 
victim host defends against SYN-flooding attack by itself 
and does not involves ISP, router and other network 
devices. Ling [28] proposed a defense procedure that uses 
the edge routers that connect end hosts to the Internet to 
store and detect whether the outgoing SYN, ACK or 
incoming SYN/ACK segment is valid. This is 
accomplished by maintaining a mapping table of the 
outgoing SYN segments and incoming SYN/ACK 
  
segments, and creating the destination and source IP 
address database. In Ming [29] a probabilistic drop scheme 
is given for implementation in a host server to mitigate 
SYN-flooding attacks. It proposes an analysis for this 
scheme, and a general principle for evaluation of the 
probability of successful connection establishment is 
presented. 
We believe that to face the problem of SYN-flooding, 
there is a need for algorithm which is independent and is 
aware of the dynamic traffic of the network and changes 
the defense parameters of the system according to network 
traffic conditions. The parameters noted in this paper are 
the maximum number of half-open connections (m) and 
the hold time	(h) of these connections where by the use of 
learning automata algorithm, the optimized values of these 
parameters are determined with respect to network 
conditions. 
First we will model the system under attack by use of 
queuing theory, and then we will discuss the learning 
automata algorithm, and using this algorithm we will offer 
our methodology, and the way to mapping the learning 
automata algorithm and will address the issue of SYN-
flooding attacks. 
2. Learning Automata 
Learning automata is an abstract model which randomly 
selects one action out of its finite set of actions and 
performs it on a random environment. Environment then 
evaluates the selected action and responds to the automata 
with a Reinforcement signal. Based on selected action, and 
received signal, the automata updates its internal state and 
selects its next action. Fig. 1 depicts the relationship 
between an automaton and its environment [20]. 
 
Fig. 1 Relationship between learning automata and its environment 
Environment can be defined by the triple E = {α, β, c} 
 where α = {α ,α , . . . , α } represents a finite input set, 
β = {β , β , . . . , β }  represents the output set, and  c =
{c , c , . . . , c } is a set of penalty probabilities, where each 
element c  of c corresponds to one input of action α . An 
environment in which β can take only binary values 0 or 1 
is referred to as P-model environment. A further 
generalization of the environment allows finite output sets 
with more than two elements that take values in the 
interval [0, 1]. Such an environment is referred to as Q-
model. Finally, when the output of the environment is a 
continuous random variable which assumes values in the 
interval [0, 1], it is referred to as an S-model. 
Learning automata are classified into fixed-structure 
stochastic, and variable-structure stochastic. In the 
following, we consider only variable-structure automata. 
A variable-structure automaton is defined by the quadruple 
LA = {α,β, p, T}  in which α = {α ,α , . . . , α }	 represents 
the action set of the automata, 	β = {β , β , . . . , β }  
represents the input set, p = {p , p , . . . , p }represents the 
action probability set, and finally P(n + 1) =
T[α(n), β(n), p(n)] represents the learning algorithm. 
This automaton operates as follows. Based on the action 
probability set, automaton randomly selects an action  α  
and performs it on the environment. After receiving the 
environment's reinforcement signal, automaton updates its 
action probability set based on Eq. 1 for favorable 
responses, and Eq. 2 for unfavorable ones. 
 
p (n + 1) = p (n) + a. (1 − p (n))	 (1) 
p (n + 1) = p (n) − a.p (n)					,			∀j						j ≠ i 
 
p (n + 1) = (1 − b). p (n)  (2) 
 
p (n + 1) =
b
r − 1
+(−b). p (n)			, ∀j						j ≠ i 
 
Learning automata is a stochastic model operating in the 
framework of reinforcement learning [24]. Reinforcement 
learning or learning with a critic is a framework of 
learning problems in which the teacher or the environment 
does not indicate the correct action, but provides only a 
scalar evaluative response to the selection of an action by 
the learner. Learning automata can be classified under the 
reinforcement learning schemes in the category of 
temporal-difference (TD) learning methods. TD learning is 
a combination of Monte Carlo ideas and dynamic 
programming ideas. Like Monte Carlo methods, TD 
methods can learn directly from raw experience without a 
model of the environment's dynamics. Like dynamic 
programming, TD methods update estimates based in part 
on other learned estimates, without waiting for a final 
outcome [24]. Q-learning [7, 10], Actor-Critic methods [1] 
and R-learning [2] are other samples of TD methods. 
Learning automata differs from other TD methods in the 
following two ways; 1.The representation of the internal 
states (a set of action probabilities) and 2. The updating 
method of the internal states (Eq.1 and Eq.2). 
Learning automata has found applications in parameter 
optimization, statistical decision making, telephone routing, 
pattern recognition, game playing, natural language 
processing, modelling biological learning systems and 
object partitioning [4]. Furthermore, learning automata is 
proved to perform well in the dynamic environments of 
  
computer networks. It is used in wireless networks for 
adaptive rate control [17], bandwidth control [21] and 
designing reliable transport layer protocol (Learning-TCP) 
[5]. 
3. Queuing model 
Since queues provide the most intuitive language for 
explaining traffic and its dependence structure, in the 
network environment [8], in this work we use queuing 
theory to draw a defense map against SYN- flooding 
attacks. Although a computer system includes several 
resources, for simplicity, we consider only one resource 
that is, memory and corresponding backlog buffer. In this 
model, all connection requests share the same backlog 
buffer. When a request arrives at the system, the system 
instantly receives a buffer space of the backlog queue upon 
finding an inactive buffer space and is blocked otherwise. 
Now, consider a server under the SYN-flooding attacks. 
Assume that in this computer each half-open connection is 
held for at most a period of time h and at most m 
concurrent half-open connections are allowed. We assume 
that a half-open connection for a regular request packet is 
held for a chance time which is exponentially distributed 
with parameter µ The arrivals of the regular request 
packets and the attack packets are both Poisson processes 
with rates 1 and 2 respectively. The two arrival 
processes are independent of each other and of the holding 
times for half-open connections. Obviously, when the 
system is under attack, then number of pending 
connections increases and in a point in which there is no 
more room for pending connection to be saved the arriving 
packets will be blocked. This leads to increased number of 
lost connections. On the other hand, when a server is under 
SYN-flooding attacks, half-open connections can quickly 
consume all the memory allocated for the pending 
connections and prevent the victim from further accepting 
new requests, leading to the well-known buffer overflow 
problem. In this case, less percentage of buffer space is 
occupied by legal requests, and major part of this space 
will be allocated to the attacker requests. 
4. Discussion 
As said earlier, as the requests with SYN packets enter the 
server, the TCP protocol places them in the backup buffer, 
and allocates necessary resources from the backup buffer 
for the establishment of a complete connection. This state 
is called the half-open state. 
On the other hand, the number of half-open confections 
that a server can create one limited and have a maximum 
value. Also the holding time of these half-open confections 
is a fixed constant our proposed algorithm is to change 
these two parameters, to dynamic condition with respect to 
the network conditions. For this reason, we define the 
following parameters. 
Ploss: a package is closed when, due to buffer being closed, 
cannot respond to a received request to create a connection. 
There for we define the Ploss as the ratio of the total 
number blocked packages to the total numbers of packages 
that have entered the server. 
Percent owner-ship of buffer via the normal requests 
(RRROP): When a half-open connection is created, it is 
placed in the buffer. The average ratio of the number of 
half-open connections created by normal request, to the 
maximum number of half-open connections that the server 
can create is called percent ownership of buffer by the 
normal request. 
Percent ownership of buffer by the attack requests (Pa): 
The average ratio of number of half-open connections 
created by attack requests to the maximum number of half-
open connection that can be created by the server is called 
percent ownership of buffer via attack requests. 
In order to increase the capability of a server to providing 
services, the value of Ploss must be sufficiently small. 
Also in order that a server provides more services to the 
normal requests, the value of buffer ownership by normal 
requests must be sufficiently big, and the time of 
ownership of buffer be the attack requests must be 
sufficiently small. 
Therefore objectives of this paper are: 
Reducing the value of request blockage. 
Increase of percent and time of occupancy of buffer by 
normal requests 
Reduction of percent and time of buffer occupancy by 
attack requests 
We use this information and define the objective function 
for LA algorithm as: 
Maximize
  
  ∗     
   (3) 
 
Therefor the higher the value of this function, the higher 
the ability of server to provide services. By use of this 
objective function we warp to use the LA algorithm to 
increase the functionality of the server that executes this 
very algorithm. Noting the common factors between the 
SYN-flooding attack and the learning automata, the LA 
algorithm is defined following. The server utilizes the 
initial (h,m)  Parameter and initiates providing services 
and at each round of modelling investigates the objective 
Function. If the new objective function is bigger than the 
best objective Function and better than the previous one , 
then the previous values of (h,m) is used, otherwise the 
(h,m)  value is updated the algorithm continues the 
execution until it reaches the desired stop Condition. 
The stages of the proposed algorithm are: 
Start  
1- Initialization of variables. 
2- In each round of simulation. 
3-1- calculation of objective function. 
  
3-2- comparison with best previous objective function and 
finding a bigger objective function (use of automata memory) 
3-3-Finding of designed (h, m) that result in maximized objective 
function (use of learned information) 
4-continuation of service processes.  
5-end 
4.1 Definition of accidental automata in SYN-
flooding 
The TCP protocol in process of establishing connections 
uses the two main parameters (h,m)  to control the 
holding-time of half-open connections and also the number 
of these connections. Therefore the two 
parameters	(h,m)	influence the behavior of TCP protocol. 
In the TCP protocol the values of (h,m) are constant. In 
this paper the (h,m)  parameters via use of learning 
automata algorithm are changed dynamically, and by 
moving to an optimal point, cause the early omission of 
the half open connections, allocated for attack requests. 
Also the (h,m) parameters make the total number of the 
system connections a function of the degree of attack and 
cause operational improvement of TCP in challenging the 
SYN-flood attacks. 
 
4.2  Suitability 
One of the main specification of any algorithm is its 
suitability. Our measures for determining suitability of a 
proposed algorithm are Ploss, Pr, and Pa. In various steps 
of execution of an algorithm the closer these measures one 
to the optimal values, the better the operation of the 
proposed algorithm. Fig. 2 shows the evaluation process of 
the LA algorithm: 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Calculation of suitability and tuning the values of (h, m) 
4.3 The procedure of mapping the LA method and 
defense in facing SYN-flooding Attacks 
In this problem the victim’s memory buffer includes a 
capacity of m with busy-time of h , h ,… , h   and there 
are n  requests, with ith request with a value of p   and 
keeps the buffer occupied for a time-interval h , with a 
remaining buffer capacity of w . The goal is to provide 
services to a subset of the normal requests, deletion of the 
attack requests, blocking the attack requests, and have high 
efficacy of service. A request is either a normal request, or 
an attack request, the problem is defined as following: 
minimize	∑ (p . x )
 
        (4) 
subject	to	M  ∶ ∑ (w . x )
 
    < h 	, ∀	i	 ∈ 1… c   
x  	 ∈ {0,1}	, ∀	i	 ∈ 1…n	   (5) 
Where xi is the decision variable with respect to waiting 
ith request. If the ithe request is a normal request, then x  
is 1, else x  is zero. The variables w , p , h  cannot assume 
negative values. 
In the proposed algorithm the problem is modeled by a 
complete graph, where every node of the graph is modeled 
with respect to a request in the defense problem. Each 
node of the graph is equipped with two operations, 
choosing of the request to be placed in the buffer, or the 
deletion of the request from the buffer. 
Fig. 3 shows the Flowchart of work of proposal method: 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Flowchart of work of proposal method 
All these processes are executed repeatedly until an 
optimal solution is reached, or we reach the condition for 
maximum required repetition of the algorithm. 
5. Result and Simulation 
Here, we study the proposed defense scheme by using two 
essential security metrics namely, the Probability of 
Success of Attack and the Buffer Utilization Efficiency. 
These two metrics represent how severe the SYN-flooding 
attacks affect the system performance. For this purpose, 
we follow manner of [30] and give some numerical 
Objective 
Function h 
m LA Server under Attack 
  
examples to exhibit how to quantify these security metrics. 
Let 1=10 as the parameter for the Poisson arrival process 
of the regular request packets and 2=k1, as the Poisson 
arrival process of the attack request packets, in which, k 
represent the ratio between arrival rates of the attack 
packets and the regular request packets. We use the 
exponential distribution with the parameter µ=100/s as the 
service time of regular request packets, and it could 
represent the strictness of congestions in the network. In 
order to study proposed approach performance in wide 
range of attack intensity, we change k from 0 to 2. Total 
number of connection request is considered 50000 requests, 
some of them are legal requests and others are attack 
connection requests. As a reference point we compare our 
approach with Linux in which m=128 and h=75s statically 
[22]. 
. 
 
Fig. 4 Attack intensity applied to the under attack server ( ) 
 
Fig. 5 ℎ changes 
Fig. 4, 5 respectively show the tendency of change in k 
and h. 
 
 
Fig. 6 probability of loss 
Fig. 6 shows the probability of blockage of requests. The 
graph shows that the values of the blocked requests of the 
LA defense algorithm are much lower. 
 
 
Fig. 7 buffer occupancy percentage of attack requests 
Fig. 7 shows the percent occupancy of buffers by attack 
requests. The graph shows that the amount of buffer space 
allotted to attack requests are lower in LA defense 
algorithm, which in turn shows that a lower number of 
attack requests have been able to create half-open 
connections.  
 
Fig. 8 buffer occupancy percentage of regular requests 
Fig. 8 shows percent occupancy of buffer by normal 
requests. The LA defense algorithm method allocates a 
higher present of buffer space to itself, and thus increases 
level of service to privileged users. 
 
 
Fig. 9   changes 
Fig. 9 shows the graph of variations in m. 
  
Figure 6 shows some simulation results to study about 
Ploss of the proposed defense. It presents Ploss for a wide 
range of attack intensity from k= [0, 2] in which Ploss 
decreases as attack intensity grows up. But, it can be seen 
in Figure 4, 5 and 6 that when h and m is tuned 
dynamically by LA, Ploss is remarkably lower than the 
cases in which h and m are set statically to 75 and 128, 
respectively. Figure 4,5 shows these dynamic values of h 
and m generated by LA algorithm in our defense scheme. 
Figure 8 shows how the proposed defense scheme 
improves performance of the under attack server in term of 
the Pr. We can observe in Figures 7 that the proposed 
algorithm, keeps Pa in lower level comparing to the case 
that uses fix values for h and m. These better results are 
coming from dynamic and intelligent setting of h and m 
shown in Figure 4, 5. While Linux uses fixed value for h 
this figure shows that when k increases and attack intensity 
goes up, LA decreases h. Hence, long life half-open 
connections that typically are attack connection are closed 
and this makes new capacity to accept new legal 
connections. On the other hand, in contrast with Linux that 
uses fixed values for m, Figure 9 shows that when k 
increases LA increases m. This makes new capacity for 
coming legal connections and hence decreases rejection 
probability of legal connections. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper represented a novel approach for defense 
against SYN-flooding attacks. We used a simple queuing 
model, to show important metrics of a network under DoS 
attacks. Then, we mapped the problem of SYN-flooding 
attack as an optimization problem and then employed LA 
technique to solve this problem. We tuned holding time 
and maximum allowable number of half-open connections 
parameters, dynamically to achieve high performance for 
the dynamic conditions of the network by LA technique. 
Simulation results confirmed success of the proposed 
approach. 
Future Works 
We offer the following suggestions for developing defense 
mechanisms to confront the SYN-flooding attacks. One 
may use the method of seek/search and filtering of the 
packets and integrate this with some of the working 
algorithms. By filtering the packets when they enter the 
server, the system will be more defensive to the attacks. 
The Genetic Algorithms, Combined Learning Automata 
Algorithm, the PSO, the Cellular Learning Algorithm, and 
the SWARM Robotic can be good future works to 
optimize the defense methods against the DoS and 
Distributed DoS attacks. 
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